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Abstract
This work considers the two-way wiretap channel in which two legitimate users, Alice and Bob, wish to exchange
messages securely in the presence of a passive eavesdropper Eve. In the full-duplex scenario, where each node can
transmit and receive simultaneously, we obtain new achievable secrecy rate regions based on the idea of allowing the
two users to jointly optimize their channel prefixing distributions and binning codebooks in addition to key sharing.
The new regions are shown to be strictly larger than the known ones for a wide class of discrete memoryless and
Gaussian channels. In the half-duplex case, where a user can only transmit or receive on any given degree of freedom,
we introduce the idea of randomized scheduling and establish the significant gain it offers in terms of the achievable
secrecy sum-rate. We further develop an experimental setup based on a IEEE 802.15.4-enabled sensor boards, and
use this testbed to show that one can exploit the two-way nature of the communication, via appropriately randomizing
the transmit power levels and transmission schedule, to introduce significant ambiguity at a noiseless Eve.
I. INTRODUCTION
In a pioneering paper [2], Shannon established the achievability of perfectly secure communication in the presence
of an eavesdropper with unbounded computational complexity. However, the necessary condition for perfect secrecy,
i.e., that the entropy of the private key is at least as large as that of the message, appears to be prohibitive for most
practical applications. In [3], Wyner revisited the problem and proved the achievability of a positive secrecy rate over
a degraded discrete memoryless channel, via a key-less secrecy approach, by relaxing the noiseless assumption and
the strict notion of perfect secrecy employed in [2]. Wyner’s results were later extended to the Gaussian and broadcast
channels in [4] and [5], respectively. In [6], Maurer showed how to exploit the presence of a public discussion
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2channel to achieve positive secrecy over the one way wiretap channel even when the eavesdropper channel is less
noisy than the legitimate one. In [7], the authors considered a more practical feedback scenario where the noiseless
public channel is replaced by receiver feedback over the same noisy channel. Under this assumption, it was shown
that the perfect secrecy capacity is equal to the capacity of the main channel in the absence of the eavesdropper
for full-duplex modulo-additive discrete memoryless channels. More interestingly, [7] established the achievability
of positive secrecy rates, even under the half-duplex constraint where each feedback symbol introduces an erasure
event in the main channel.
Our work generalizes this line of work by investigating the fundamental limits of the two-way wiretap channel,
where Alice and Bob wish to exchange secure messages in the presence of a passive eavesdropper Eve. It is easy to
see that the one way channel with feedback considered in [7] is a special case of this model. Using the cooperative
channel prefixing and binning technique proposed in [8], [9], along with an innovative approach for key sharing
between Alice and Bob, we first derive an inner bound on the secrecy capacity region of the full-duplex discrete
memoryless two-way wiretap channel. By specializing our results to the additive modulo-2 and Gaussian channel,
our region is shown to be strictly larger than those reported recently in the literature [10], [11], [13]. The gain
can be attributed to the fact that we allow both nodes to simultaneously send secure messages when the channel
conditions are favorable. We then proceed to the half-duplex setting where each node can only transmit or receive
on the same degree of freedom. Here, we introduce the concept of randomized scheduling for secrecy, whereby
Alice and Bob send their symbols at random time instants to maximally confuse Eve at the expense of introducing
collisions and erasure events in the main channel. Remarkably, this approach is shown to result in significant
gains in the achievable secure sum rate, as compared with the traditional deterministic scheduling approach. In the
Gaussian scenario, we show that the ambiguity at Eve can be further enhanced by randomizing the transmit power
levels.
Inspired by our information theoretic foundation, we develop an IEEE 802.15.4 testbed to estimate the ambiguity
at the eavesdropper in near field wireless sensor networks where the distance between the legitimate nodes is
significantly smaller than that to the potential eavesdropper. A representative scenario corresponds to Body Area
Networks (BAN) which are being considered for a variety of health care applications. Here, the sensor nodes are
mounted on the body, and hence, any potential eavesdropper is expected to be at a significantly larger distance
from each legitimate node. Clearly, ensuring the confidentiality of the messages exchanged between sensors is an
important design consideration in this application. Assuming an eavesdropper equipped with an energy classifier,
analytical and experimental results that quantify the achievable secrecy sum rate under a two dimensional path
loss model are derived. However, it is worth noting that we do not address the issue of implementing the classical
wiretap code [3] in this work. Overall, these results establish the gain offered by the two-way randomization concept
and establish the feasibility of our approach in realistic scenarios.
It is worth noting that similar settings to the one considered in this work, exist in the literature. In particular, the
authors in [15] consider a binary erasure block-fading channel where the nodes are placed according to a similar
geometric model to that in Section IV, and provide analytical and experimental results for the secrecy outage
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3probabilities for frames of different sizes, [14] considers an extension of the two-way wiretap channel where the
untrusted eavesdropper may be used to relay messages between the two users. Also, [16] considers the two-way
wiretap channel with a strong secrecy constraint, where the mutual information leakage to the eavesdropper, rather
than the leakage rate (defined in Section II) is required to vanish in the limit of the number of channel uses.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section II, we develop an achievable secrecy rate region for the
full-duplex discrete memoryless two-way wiretap channel, and specialize the result to the additive modulo-2 and
Gaussian channel. Section III is devoted to the half-duplex scenario where the concept of randomized scheduling is
introduced. Our practical setting, using the TinyOS-enabled sensor boards, is described in Section IV. The analytical
and experimental results of this section establish the feasibility of our approach in near field wireless sensor network
applications. Finally, we offer some concluding remarks in Section V. To enhance the flow of the paper, the detailed
proofs are collected in the appendices.
II. FULL-DUPLEX CHANNELS
In the full-duplex scenario, each of the two legitimate terminals is equipped with a transmitter and a receiver
that can operate simultaneously on the same degree of freedom. The two users intend to exchange messages in
the presence of a (passive) eavesdropper. More specifically, the ith user wishes to transmit a secret message wi,
selected from a set of equiprobable messages Mi = {1, . . . ,Mi}, to the other user, in n channel uses, where
i = 1, 2. For message wi, a codeword Xi(wi) = {Xi(1), . . . , Xi(n)} is transmitted at a rate Ri = 1n log2Mi. The
ith decoder employs a decoding function φi(.) to map the received sequence Yi to an estimate wˆi of wi. The
two-way communication is governed by reliability and secrecy constraints. The former is measured by the average
probability of error,
Pe,i =
1
Mi
∑
wi∈Mi
P{wˆi 6= wi|wi is sent}, for i = 1, 2;
whereas the latter is quantified by the mutual information leakage rate to the eavesdropper L, i.e.,
Ln =
1
n
I(W1,W2;Z),
where Z = {Z(1), . . . , Z(n)} is the observed sequence at the eavesdropper. Here, we focus on the perfect secrecy
rate region, where the leakage rate is made arbitrarily small [3], as formalized in the following.
Definition 1: The secret rate tuple (R1, R2) is achievable for the two-way wiretap channel, if for any given
ǫ > 0, there exists an (n,M1,M2, Pe,1, Pe,2, Ln) code such that,
R1 =
1
n
log2M1
R2 =
1
n
log2M2
max(Pe,1, Pe,2) ≤ ǫ
Ln ≤ ǫ,
for sufficiently large n.
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4We note that the last condition implies that (see, e.g., [9, Lemma 15])
1
n
H(Wi|Z) ≥ Ri − ǫ for i = 1, 2.
The secrecy capacity region is defined as the set of all achievable secret rate tuples (R1, R2) and is denoted
by CF . Throughout the sequel, we will use the following shorthand notation for probability distributions: P (x) ,
P (X = x), P (x|y) , P (X = x|Y = y), and P (x, y) , P (X = x, Y = y), where X and Y denote arbitrary
random variables. We will also use log(x) to denote log2(x), and [a]+ to denote max(a, 0). Furthermore, for the
full-duplex discrete memoryless two-way channel with an external passive eavesdropper (DM-TWC-E), we will use
the calligraphic letters X1 and X2 to denote the discrete input finite alphabets for user 1 and user 2, respectively,
and Y1, Y2, and Z , to denote the output alphabets observed at the decoders of user 1, user 2, and the eavesdropper,
respectively. The channel is given by P (y1, y2, z|x1, x2) and is memoryless in the following sense.
P (y1(t), y2(t), z(t)|xt1,xt2,yt−11 ,yt−12 , zt−1) = P (y1(t), y2(t), z(t)|x1(t), x2(t)).
We further assume all channel state information to be available at all nodes. Our general achievable region is
obtained via a coding scheme inspired by [9] where the codewords C1 and C2 are drawn from the two binning
codebooks, and passed on to the two respective prefix channels. To maximize the ambiguity at Eve, both the binning
codebooks and channel prefixing distributions are jointly optimized. In addition, the proposed scheme involves key
sharing with a block encoding technique to facilitate the secrecy generation. In particular, the key received from
the other user during the previous block is used in a one time pad scheme [17] to transmit additional secret bits.
The codeword consisting of the XOR of the message and the key serves a) as a cloud center in the superposition
coding and b) as an additional randomization for the binning codebook. The following result characterizes the set
of achievable rates using our coding scheme.
Theorem 1: The proposed coding scheme achieves the region R for the full-duplex DM-TWC-E.
R , closure of


⋃
p∈P
R(p)

 ⊆ CF ,
where P denotes the set of all joint distributions of the random variables Q, U1, U2, C1, C2, X1, and X2 satisfying
P (q, u1, u2, c1, c2, x1, x2) = P (q)P (u1|q)P (c1|u1)P (x1|c1)P (u2|q)P (c2|u2)P (x2|c2)
and R(p) is the closure of all rate pairs (R1 = Ru1 + Rs1 + Ro1, R2 = Ru2 + Rs2 + Ro2), with non-negative tuples
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5(Ru1 , R
s
1, R
o
1, R
x
1 , R
u
2 , R
s
2, R
o
2, R
x
2) satisfying
Rs1 +R
k
1 +R
o
1 +R
x
1 ≤ I(C1;Y2|X2, U1, Q) (1)
Ru1 +R
s
1 +R
k
1 +R
o
1 +R
x
1 ≤ I(U1, C1;Y2|X2, Q) (2)
Rs2 +R
k
2 +R
o
2 +R
x
2 ≤ I(C2;Y1|X1, U2, Q) (3)
Ru2 +R
s
2 +R
k
2 +R
o
2 +R
x
2 ≤ I(U2, C2;Y1|X1, Q) (4)
Ro1 +R
x
1 ≤ I(C1;Z|U1, U2, C2, Q) (5)
Ro2 +R
x
2 ≤ I(C2;Z|U1, U2, C1, Q) (6)
Ro1 +R
x
1 +R
o
2 +R
x
2 = I(C1, C2;Z|U1, U2, Q) (7)
Ru1 +R
o
1 ≤ Rk2 (8)
Ru2 +R
o
2 ≤ Rk1 (9)
Proof: Please refer to Appendix A.
For i = 1, 2, Rsi denotes the rate of physically secure transmission for user i. i.e., the part of message Wi that is
secured using cooperative binning and channel prefixing only, Rki denotes the rate of key transmission from user i
to the other user, Roi denotes the rate of transmission of the open part of message Wi that is secured using the secret
key received from the other user in the previous block. The classical wiretap code [3] requires sacrificing part of the
rate available for reliable communication, to exploit the secrecy advantage offered by the physical channel (in our
case, the equivalent channel after inserting the channel prefix) in order to hide the message from the eavesdropper.
The aforementioned part equals Roi + Rxi for user i. Note that the eavesdropper may be able to decode this part
of message Wi, including the open part, but that will not violate the secrecy condition since this part is secured
by the secret key received from the other user. The possibility of using a superposition code [18] to transmit the
physically secured message is allowed, where all nodes - including the eavesdropper - can identify the position of
the cloud center, however, the part of the message conveyed through the cloud center is secured through the secret
key received from the other user in the previous block, and in this case the rate of transmission for this part is
given by Rui . The random variables Q and U denote the time sharing random variable and the cloud center of the
superposition code, respectively.
Inequalities (1)- (4) follow from the reliable communication constraint, and the conditions in (5)- (7) ensure that
enough randomization is inserted through the wiretap code into the multiple access channel from the two legitimate
nodes to the eavesdropper, such that the secrecy constraint is satisfied. Finally, the conditions in (8)- (9) follow
from the fact that the entropy of the part of the message that is secured using the secret key received from the
other user is bounded by the entropy of that key [2]. Note that the role of key sharing evident from the above
inequalities, is not to increase the sum rate, but to give complete freedom in distributing the the secrecy advantage
offered by the two-way wiretap channel (after inserting the channel prefixes) between the two users.
Remark 1: The proposed coding scheme can be used to exchange open messages (secured using the secret key)
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6in addition to the physically secure ones between Alice and Bob, even through the cloud center of the superposition
code. More Specifically, the rate Rui can be split into an open part Ruoi and a physically secured part Rusi . Let
Rsecreti and R
open
i be the secret and open message rates of transmitter i = 1, 2. Then, the proposed scheme readily
achieves the four-dimensional rate region given by the closure of the union (over all input probability distributions)
of the set of rate tuples
(Rsecret1 = R
s
1 +R
o
1 +R
us
1 , R
open
1 = R
x
1 +R
uo
1 , R
secret
2 = R
s
2 +R
o
2 +R
us
2 , R
open
2 = R
x
2 +R
uo
2 ),
with the non-negative rate tuples (Rus1 , Ruo1 , Rs1, Ro1, Rx1 , Rus2 , Ruo2 , Rs2, Ro2, Rx2) satisfying (1)-(7) with Ru1 = Rus1 +
Ruo1 , R
u
2 = R
us
2 +R
uo
2 and Rus1 +Ro1 ≤ Rk2 , Rus2 +Ro2 ≤ Rk1 .
One can immediately see that the region R does not lend itself to simple computational approaches. Therefore,
the rest of the section will focus primarily on the following sub-region RF .
Theorem 2: For the full-duplex DM-TWC-E,
RF , closure of


⋃
p∈PF
RF (p)

 ⊆ R ⊆ CF ,
where PF denotes the set of all joint distributions of the random variables Q, C1, C2, X1, and X2 satisfying
P (q, c1, c2, x1, x2) = P (q)P (c1|q)P (c2|q)P (x1|c1)P (x2|c2)
and RF (p) is the closure of all non-negative rate tuples (R1, R2) satisfying
R1 ≤ I(C1;Y2|X2, Q)
R2 ≤ I(C2;Y1|X1, Q)
R1 +R2 ≤ I(C1;Y2|X2, Q) + I(C2;Y1|X1, Q)− I(C1, C2;Z|Q).
Proof: Please refer to Appendix B.
Note that the above region, RF , is achievable without the need to use superposition coding, hence it is not clear
to us whether the use of a superposition code is needed or not. (Please refer to Remark 2 in Appendix B.)
A. The Modulo-Two Channel
To shed more light on the structural properties of our achievable rate region, we now consider the special case
of the full-duplex modulo-2 two-way wiretap channel described by the following set of input-output relations.
Y1 = X1 ⊕X2 ⊕N1
Y2 = X1 ⊕X2 ⊕N2
Z = X1 ⊕X2 ⊕Ne,
where N1= {N1(1), . . . , N1(n)}, N2= {N2(1), . . . , N2(n)}, and Ne= {Ne(1), . . . , Ne(n)} are the additive binary
noise vectors impairing Alice, Bob, and Eve, respectively. The corresponding transition probabilities are given by:
P (N1(t) = 1) = ǫ1, P (N2(t) = 1) = ǫ2, and P (Ne(t) = 1) = ǫe for i = 1, . . . , n. The secrecy capacity region is
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7denoted by CFM . In this special case, the transmitted codeword reduces to the modulo-2 sum of a binning codeword
and an independent prefix noise component, i.e.,
X1 = C1 ⊕ N¯1
X2 = C2 ⊕ N¯2,
where N¯1= {N¯1(1), . . . , N¯1(n)}, N¯2= {N¯2(1), . . . , N¯2(n)} are the prefix noise vectors transmitted by Alice and
Bob. The components of these vectors are generated according to i.i.d. distributions with the following marginals:
P (N¯1(t) = 1) = ǫ¯1, P (N¯2(t) = 1) = ǫ¯2 for i = 1, . . . , n. The binning codebooks, on the other hand, are generated
according to a uniform i.i.d. distribution. We further define the following crossover probabilities to describe the
cascade of the prefix and original channels.
P (y1 6= c2|c2) = ǫˆ1 , ǫ1(1− ǫ¯2) + ǫ¯2(1− ǫ1)
P (y2 6= c1|c1) = ǫˆ2 , ǫ2(1− ǫ¯1) + ǫ¯1(1− ǫ2)
P (z 6= (c1 ⊕ c2)|c1, c2) = ǫˆe , ǫe(1− ǫ¯12) + ǫ¯12(1− ǫe)
where, ǫ¯12 = ǫ¯2(1−ǫ¯1)+ǫ¯1(1−ǫ¯2). The need for the channel prefixes is evident in the case when the physical channel
does not offer a secrecy advantage. For example, for the case when all channels are noiseless (ǫ1 = ǫ2 = ǫe = 0),
no positive secrecy rates are achievable with only binning and key sharing. However, it is easy to see that the rates
(R1, R2) = (1, 0) and (0, 1) are achievable with a choice of (ǫ¯1, ǫ¯2) = (0, 0.5) and (0.5, 0), respectively. Using the
above notation, the achievable region in Theorem 2 reduces to the region RFM defined as follows.
Corollary 1: For the full-duplex modulo-2 two-way wiretap channel
RFM , closure of the convex hull of


⋃
p∈PFM
RFM (p)

 ⊆ CFM ,
where PFM is defined as,
PFM , {(ǫ¯1, ǫ¯2) : 0 ≤ ǫ¯1, ǫ¯2 ≤ 1},
and RFM (p) is the closure of all non-negative rate tuples (R1, R2) satisfying
R1 ≤ 1−H(ǫˆ2)
R2 ≤ 1−H(ǫˆ1)
R1 +R2 ≤ 1 +H(ǫˆe)−H(ǫˆ1)−H(ǫˆ2).
Moreover, our achievable region contains the two corner points of the secrecy capacity region, namely
max
(R1,0)∈C
R1 = 1−H(ǫ1), and
max
(0,R2)∈C
R2 = 1−H(ǫ2).
Proof: Please refer to Appendix C.
October 30, 2018 DRAFT
8A few remarks are now in order.
1) The region in Corollary 1 is strictly larger than the ones reported in [10], [11], as demonstrated by the
numerical results of Fig. 1. Here we compare our region with the one achieved by random binning and key
sharing only, and channel prefixing only ( [10, Section 5]). The region reported in [11, Theorem 2] can be
achieved via binning without key sharing, hence, is a strict sub-region of Corollary 1.
2) The corner points of the region in Corollary 1 is achieved by random binning and key sharing only if
ǫe > max(ǫ1, ǫ2), and achieved by only channel prefixing if ǫe < min(ǫ1, ǫ2).
3) The previous result identifies the separate role of channel prefixing and binning. First, channel prefixing is
used to create an advantage of Alice and Bob over Eve via the joint optimization of ǫ¯1 and ǫ¯2. Then, the
binning codebooks are used to transform this advantage into a secrecy gain for the two terminals.
B. The Gaussian Channel
In the full-duplex Gaussian setting, the channel is given by,
Y1 =
√
g11X1 +X2 +N1
Y2 = X1 +
√
g22X2 +N2
Z =
√
ge1X1 +
√
ge2X2 +Ne
where g11, g22, ge1, and ge2 are channel coefficients, N1, N2, and Ne are i.i.d. noise vectors with zero-mean unit-
variance white Gaussian entries at user 1, user 2, and Eve, respectively. We assume the average power constraints
given by
1
n
n∑
t=1
(Xi(t))
2 ≤ ρi, for i = 1, 2.
The secrecy capacity of this channel is denoted by CFG.
We define γ(x) , 12 log(1+x) and h(X) = −
∫
fX(x) log fX(x). The prefix to the channel from user 1 to user 2
is an additive white Gaussian noise channel with i.i.d. noise N¯1 ∼ N (0, ρn1 ), where the allocated power for user 1 is
distributed among the signal C1 and the artificial noise N¯1. More specifically, C1 ∼ N (0, ρc1), and ρc1+ρn1 = ρ1−ǫ,
and the transmitted signal X1 = C1 + N¯1. By the weak law of large numbers, 1n
∑n
t=1(X1(t))
2 → ρ1 − ǫ as
n→∞. X2 is constructed similarly to obtain the following.
Corollary 2: For the full-duplex Gaussian two-way wiretap channel, the achievable rate region RFG is given by,
RFG , closure of the convex hull of
{ ⋃
p∈PFG
RFG(p)
}
⊆ CFG,
where PFG is defined as,
PFG , {(ρc1, ρn1 , ρc2, ρn2 ) : ρc1 + ρn1 ≤ ρ1, ρc2 + ρn2 ≤ ρ2},
and RFG(p) is the closure of all non-negative rate tuples (R1, R2) satisfying
R1 ≤ γ
(
ρc1
1 + ρn1
)
October 30, 2018 DRAFT
9R2 ≤ γ
(
ρc2
1 + ρn2
)
R1 +R2 ≤ γ
(
ρc1
1 + ρn1
)
+ γ
(
ρc2
1 + ρn2
)
− γ
(
ρc1ge1 + ρ
c
2ge2
1 + ρn1 ge1 + ρ
n
2 ge2
)
Proof: The proof follows by extending Theorem 2 to continuous random variables, where we also set |Q| = 1,
and use the convex hull operation. The tools needed to extend the probability of error and equivocation analysis
are already available in the literature[e.g. see [11] and [12]].
In Fig. 2, we compare the region of Corollary 2 with the following special cases: 1) Both users implement
cooperative binning and key sharing without channel prefixing and 2) One of the users implements individual
secrecy encoding [3], the other helps only with channel prefixing. The same trends of the modulo-2 case are
observed here except for the fact that channel prefixing does not achieve the two extreme points of RFG. We note
that the region reported in [11, Theorem 2] can be achieved by implementing binning without key sharing, and
hence, is a sub-region of Corollary 2. The scheme in [11, Section V] is either binning only at both users, or binning
at one user and channel prefixing (jamming) at the other user. The resulting regions are subregions of Corollary 2
(the first one is a subregion of the dashed region and the second one is the dotted region in Fig. 2.). Next, we
compare our results with that of [13]. Let,
R∗1 , max
α∈[0,1]
α

γ(ρ1)−
[
γ
(
ge1ρ1
1 + ge2ρ2
)
− 1− α
α
[
γ (ρ2)− γ
(
ge2ρ2
1 + ge1ρ1
)]+]+
+
R∗2 is obtained by reversing the indices above. Then, the achievable rate region proposed in [13] is given by the
convex hull of the following three points:
[0, 0], [R∗1, 0], and [0, R∗2].
We note that the region RFG given in Corollary 2 strictly includes this one. (The proof of the inclusion part is
given in Appendix D.) Fig. 3 demonstrates the fact that the inclusion can be strict. The same figure also includes
the achievable region obtained by backward key sharing only. In this scheme, users utilize only the one time pad
scheme in a time division manner where the node first receives a secret key and then uses it to secure the message.
The corresponding region can be described as follows. Let
R†1 , max
α∈[0,1]
min
{
αγ(ρ1), (1− α)
[
γ(ρ2)− γ
(
ge2ρ2
1 + ge1ρ1
)]+}
.
R†2 is obtained by reversing the indices above. Then backward key sharing achieves the convex hull of the following
three points:
[0, 0], [R†1, 0], and [0, R
†
2].
Note that, this is a subregion of R (given in Theorem 1), in which C2 is used to transmit secret key from user
2 to user 1, and U1 is utilized to transmit secret message in a one time pad fashion. Comparing R†1 and R∗1 in
Fig. 3, we can see that this scheme can achieve higher rates than the ones reported in [13]. We also remark that
this example is an evidence of the fact that the region in Theorem 1 strictly includes that of Theorem 2. (That is,
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RF ( R as R†1 /∈ RF but R†1 ∈ R for the Gaussian channel.) In summary, the region in Theorem 1 includes all
the stated regions as special cases.
III. HALF-DUPLEX CHANNELS
Our first step is to define the following equivalent full-duplex model for the half-duplex channel.
Definition 2: For a given half-duplex channel governed by P (y2, z|x1), P (y1, z|x2), P (z|x1, x2), and P (y1)P (y2)P (z)
an equivalent full-duplex channel P ∗(y1, y2, z|x1, x2) is defined as follows.
We allow the channel inputs to take the values in X ∗i = {Xi, ?}, where ? represents the no transmission event.
Similarly the channel outputs take values in Y∗i = {Yi, ?}, where ? represents the no reception event (due to the
half-duplex constraint). Then, for the tth symbol time, the full-duplex channel P ∗(y1, y2, z|x1, x2) is said to be in
one of the following states:
1) x1(t) ∈ X1, x2(t) =? : User 1 is transmitting, user 2 is in no transmission state.
2) x1(t) =?, x2(t) ∈ X2 : User 1 is in no transmission state, user 2 is transmitting.
3) x1(t) ∈ X1, x2(t) ∈ X2 : Both users are transmitting.
4) x1(t) =?, x2(t) =? : Both users are in the no transmission state.
Accordingly, the channel P ∗(y1, y2, z|x1, x2) is given by
P ∗(y1, y2, z|x1, x2) =


P (y2, z|x1, x2 =?)1{y1,?}, for state 1
P (y1, z|x1 =?, x2)1{y2,?}, for state 2
P (z|x1, x2)1{y1,?}1{y2,?}, for state 3
P (y1, y2, z|x1, ?, x2 =?), for state 4,
where 1{x,y} = 1, if x = y and 1{x,y} = 0, if x 6= y, and P (y2, z|x1, x2 =?), P (y1, z|x1 =?, x2), P (z|x1, x2),
and P (y1, y2, z|x1 =?, x2 =?) are given by the half-duplex channel.
Using this definition and our results for the full-duplex channel, we obtain the following result.
Corollary 3 (Deterministic Scheduling): The following region RH−D is achievable for the half-duplex DM-
TWC-E with deterministic scheduling.
RH−D , the closure of


⋃
P∈PH ,Ps1+Ps2=1
RH−D(P )

 ,
where PH denotes the set of all joint distributions of the random variables Q, C1, C2, X1, and X2 satisfying
P (q, c1, c2, x1, x2) = P (q)P (c1|q)P (c2|q)P (x1|c1)P (x2|c2),
RH−D(P ) is the closure of all non-negative rate tuples (R1, R2) satisfying
R1 ≤ Ps1I(C1;Y2|Q, state 1)
R2 ≤ Ps2I(C2;Y1|Q, state 2)
R1 +R2 ≤ Ps1[I(C1;Y2|Q, state 1)− I(C1;Z|Q, state 1)]+
+Ps2[I(C2;Y1|Q, state 2)− I(C2;Z|Q, state 2)]+,
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and the channel is given by P ∗(y1, y2, z|x1, x2) as defined in (10).
Proof: The proof follows by Theorem 1 with the channel given by P ∗(y1, y2, z|x1, x2). In each block we
randomly select a state S = k with probability Ps,k, and replace Q by {Q,S}, where the random sequence s
represents the channel states (and given to all nodes). The achievable region can be represented with the given
description, where the inputs are chosen such that we only utilize state 1 and 2 as the states 3 and 4 do not increase
the achievable rates.
The previous region is achievable with a deterministic scheduling approach whereby the two users Alice and
Bob a-priori agree on the schedule. Consequently, Eve is made aware of the schedule. Now, in order to further
confuse the eavesdropper, we propose a novel randomized scheduling scheme whereby, in each channel use, user
i will be in a transmission state with probability Pi. Clearly, this approach will result in collisions, wasting some
opportunities for using the channels. However, as established shortly, the gain resulting from confusing Eve about
the source of each transmitted symbol will outweigh these inefficiencies in many relevant scenarios. To simplify
our derivations, we assume that all the nodes can identify perfectly state 4 (no transmission state). Furthermore,
we also give Eve an additional advantage by informing her of the symbol durations belonging to state 3, and as
a result we have the term −P1P2I(C1, C2;Z|Q, state 3) in the sum rate constraint below. These assumptions are
practical in the Gaussian channel, where the users can use the received power levels to distinguish these states. The
following result characterizes the corresponding achievable region.
Corollary 4 (Randomized Scheduling): The region RH is achievable for the half-duplex DM-TWC-E with ran-
domized scheduling.
RH , closure of


⋃
P∈PH ,0≤P1,P2≤1
RH(P )

 ,
where PH denotes the set of all joint distributions of the random variables Q, C1, C2, X1, and X2 satisfying
P (q, c1, c2, x1, x2) = P (q)P (c1|q)P (c2|q)P (x1|c1)P (x2|c2),
RH(P ) is the closure of all non-negative rate tuples (R1, R2) satisfying
R1 ≤ P1(1− P2)I(C1;Y2|X2, Q, state 1)
R2 ≤ (1− P1)P2I(C2;Y1|X1, Q, state 2)
R1 +R2 ≤ P1(1− P2)I(C1;Y2|X2, Q, state 1) + (1− P1)P2I(C2;Y1|X1, Q, state 2)
−P1P2I(C1, C2;Z|Q, state 3)− (P1(1− P2) + (1− P1)P2)I(C1, C2;Z|Q, state 1 or 2),
and the channel is given by P ∗(y1, y2, z|x1, x2) as defined in (10).
Proof: Please refer to Appendix E.
Similar to the full-duplex scenario, we now specialize our results to the modulo-2 case. We model this channel
as a ternary input channel where the third input corresponds to the no-transmission event. This way, the three
nodes can identify the symbol intervals when no one is transmitting. Therefore, those symbols will be identified
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and erased, and the crossover probabilities corresponding to the other three states are given by,
P (z 6= c1|only user 1 is transmitting) = ǫe1 , ǫe(1− ǫ¯1) + ǫ¯1(1− ǫe)
P (z 6= c2|only user 2 is transmitting) = ǫe2 , ǫe(1− ǫ¯2) + ǫ¯2(1− ǫe)
P (z 6= (c1 ⊕ c2)|both users are transmitting) = ǫˆe
where ǫˆe is given as in the previous section. Moreover, for some µ1, µ2 ∈ [0, 1], we define the followings,
P (y1 = 1|only user 2 is transmitting) = µˆ1 , ǫˆ1(1− µ2) + µ2(1− ǫˆ1)
P (y2 = 1|only user 1 is transmitting) = µˆ2 , ǫˆ2(1− µ1) + µ1(1− ǫˆ2)
P (z = 1|only user 1 is transmitting) = µe1 , ǫe1(1− µ1) + µ1(1− ǫe1)
P (z = 1|only user 2 is transmitting) = µe2 , ǫe2(1− µ2) + µ2(1− ǫe2)
P (z = 1|both users are transmitting) = µˆe , ǫˆe(1− µ12) + µ12(1− ǫˆe),
where, ǫˆ1 and ǫˆ2 are given as in the previous section, and µ12 = µ1(1−µ2) +µ2(1−µ1). Using these definitions,
the following result is obtained.
Proposition 1: The set of achievable rates for the half-duplex modulo-2 two-way wiretap channel RHM is given
by,
RHM , closure of the convex hull of
{ ⋃
P∈PHM
RHM (P )
}
,
where PHM is defined as,
PHM , {(ǫ¯1, ǫ¯2, µ1, µ2, P1, P2) : 0 ≤ ǫ¯1, ǫ¯2, µ1, µ2, P1, P2 ≤ 1, },
and RHM (P ) is the closure of all non-negative rate tuples (R1, R2) satisfying
R1 ≤ P1(1− P2)(H(µˆ2)−H(ǫˆ2))
R2 ≤ P2(1− P1)(H(µˆ1)−H(ǫˆ1))
R1 +R2 ≤ P1(1 − P2)(H(µˆ2)−H(ǫˆ2)) + P2(1− P1)(H(µˆ1)−H(ǫˆ1))
− P1P2(H(µˆe)−H(ǫˆe))
− (P1(1− P2) + P2(1 − P1))(
H(µe1d1 + µe2d2)− 0.5H(d1ǫe1 + d2ǫe2)− 0.5H(d1(1− ǫe1) + d2ǫe2)
)
,
where
d1 =
P1(1− P2)
P1(1− P2) + P2(1− P1) , and
d2 = 1− d1.
Proof: Please refer to Appendix F.
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The advantage offered by randomized scheduling is best demonstrated in the following example. First, we observe
that cooperative binning and channel prefixing scheme with deterministic scheduling fails to achieve a non-zero
secrecy rate if Eve’s channel is not more noisy than the legitimate channels. Now, consider the noiseless case, i.e.,
ǫ1 = ǫ2 = ǫe = 0. By setting µ1 = µ2 = P1 = P2 = 0.5, ǫ¯1 = 0, and ǫ¯2 = 0.5, Proposition 1 shows that the
randomized scheduling approach allows user 1 to achieve a secure rate of R1 = 0.25− 0.5(1−H(0.25)) > 0.
The final step is to specialize the region to the Gaussian channel with half-duplex nodes. Eve is again assumed
to perfectly identify the no transmission and simultaneous transmission states. We select codewords and jamming
sequences as Gaussian (with powers ρci and ρni , respectively). In addition, to further increase Eve’s ambiguity, users
jointly set (ρci + ρni )gei to the same value ρr (assuming the channel knowledge at both users). The following result
is readily available.
Proposition 2: The set of achievable rates for the half-duplex Gaussian two-way wiretap channel RHG is given
by,
RHG , closure of the convex hull of
{ ⋃
P∈PHG
RHG(P )
}
where PHG is defined as,
PHG , {(ρc1, ρn1 , ρc2, ρn2 , P1, P2) : 0 ≤ P1, P2 ≤ 1, (ρc1 + ρn1 )ge1 = (ρc2 + ρn2 )ge2 = ρr,
P1(ρ
c
1 + ρ
n
1 ) ≤ ρ1, P2(ρc2 + ρn2 ) ≤ ρ2},
and RHG(P ) is the closure of all non-negative rate tuples (R1, R2) satisfying
R1 ≤ P1(1 − P2)γ
(
ρc1
1 + ρn1
)
R2 ≤ P2(1 − P1)γ
(
ρc2
1 + ρn2
)
R1 +R2 ≤ P1(1− P2)γ
(
ρc1
1 + ρn1
)
+ P2(1− P1)γ
(
ρc2
1 + ρn2
)
+ h(Z|C1, C2)− h(Z),
where
h(Z)− h(Z|C1, C2) = P1P2γ
(
ρc1ge1 + ρ
c
2ge2
1 + ρn1 ge1 + ρ
n
2 ge2
)
+ (P1(1− P2) + P2(1 − P1))1
2
log(2πe(1 + ρr))
−(P1(1− P2) + P2(1− P1))
∫ ∞
j=−∞
∫ ∞
i=−∞
fC1(i)fC2(j)h(Z|i, j)dfC1dfC2 ,
and
fZ|C1,C2(z|i, j) = d1f(z; i, 1 + ρn1 ge1) + d2f(z; j, 1 + ρn2 ge2),
d1 =
P1(1− P2)
P1(1− P2) + P2(1− P1) ,
d2 = 1− d1,
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and f(x;µ, σ2) is the value at x of the probability density function of a Gaussian random variable with mean µ
and variance σ2.
We remark that the ambiguity at Eve can be further increased by randomizing the transmit power levels at the
expense of more receiver complexity (due to the non-coherent nature of the transmissions). We implemented this
randomization idea in the next section, where the complexity issue is resolved by using energy classifiers.
IV. RANDOMIZATION FOR SECRECY: PRACTICAL IMPLEMENTATION
In this section, we study a more practical half-duplex Gaussian setting where the constant channel coefficients are
determined by the distance-based path losses in a 2-D geometric model. Our focus will be devoted to the symmetric
case where the two messages have the same rate. Without any loss of generality, Alice and Bob are assumed to
be located on the x-axis at opposite ends of the origin and Eve is assumed to be located outside a circle centered
around the origin of radius rE at an angle θ of the x-axis (see Figure 4). This key assumption faithfully models
the spatial separation, between the legitimate nodes and eavesdropper(s), which characterizes near field wireless
networks like Body Area Networks (BAN) [see e.g. [19]]. The performance of the proposed secure randomized
scheduling communication scheme will be obtained as a function of rE and the distance between Alice and Bob,
i.e., dAB . In the discrete-time model, the signals received by the three nodes in the tth symbol interval are given
by
Y1(t) = 1{X1(t),0}
[
GA(d
−α/2
AA X1(t)e
−jkdAA + d−α/2AB X2(t)e
−jkdAB ) +N1(t)
]
Y2(t) = 1{X2(t),0}
[
GB(d
−α/2
AB X1(t)e
−jkdAB + d−α/2BB X2(t)e
−jkdBB ) +N2(t)
]
Z(t) = GE(d
−α/2
AE X1(t)e
−jkdAE + d−α/2BE X2(t)e
−jkdBE ) +Ne(t),
where k is the wave number, GA, GB and GE are propagation constants which depend on the receive antenna
gains, and α is the path loss exponent which will be taken to 2 as in the free space propagation scenario. (One can
easily extend our results for other scenarios with different path loss exponents.) For further simplicity, we restrict
ourselves to binary encoding implying that X1(t) ∈
{
−√ρ(t), 0,√ρ(t)}, where ρ(t) is the instantaneous signal
to noise ratio at unit distance in the tth symbol interval if Alice decides to transmit. X1(t) = 0 if Alice decides not
to transmit. The same applies to X2(t). ρ(t) is selected randomly in the range [ρmin, ρmax], by varying the transmit
power, according to a distribution that is known a priori to all nodes. The indicator function 1{x,y} is defined as
in Section III. In order to ensure the robustness of our results, we assume that Eve employs a large enough receive
antenna, i.e., GE >> 1, such that her receiver has a high enough SNR and the additive noise effect in Z can
be ignored. We assume GA = GB = 1, and a hard decision decoder at both the legitimate receiver(s) and the
eavesdropper. We consider a memoryless classifier C used by Eve to identify the origin of each received symbol,
i.e., the decision is based only on the power level of the observed symbol in the current time interval. Here, Pm and
Pf represent the probability of miss detection and false alarm, respectively. Furthermore, we use Pe|m to denote
the probability of symbol error given occurrence of the miss detection event. Finally, we use the following notation:
φ(x) ,
x∫
−∞
1√
2π
e
−t
2
2 dt.
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The deterministic scheduling paradigm is represented by a Time Division Multiplexing scheme whereby only a
single message is transmitted in any given time frame, and the legitimate receiver jams the channel with random-
content feedback symbols at random time intervals. More specifically, the receiver will transmit a feedback symbol
at any time interval with probability β. This feedback will result in erroneous outputs at the eavesdropper due to
its inability to identify the symbols corrupted by the random feedback signal and erasures at the legitimate receiver
due to the half-duplex constraint. As argued in [7], this scheme is capable of completely impairing Eve in modulo-
additive channels. In our real-valued channel, however, a simple energy classifier based on the average received
signal power [20] can be used by Eve to differentiate between corrupted and non-jammed symbols. To overcome
this problem, we use pre-determined distributions for the transmit power of both the data symbols, f1, and feedback
symbols f2. This randomized power allocation strategy is intended to increase the probability of misclassification
at Eve. The following result characterizes the achievable rate with this scheme.
Theorem 3: Using the proposed TDM protocol with randomized feedback and power allocation, the following
secrecy rate is achievable at each user.
Rs = 0.5 max
β,f1,f2
{
min
θ,C
{
[RM −RE ]+
}}
,
where
RM = (1 − β)
(
1−H
(
1− φ
(√
ρmin
dAB
α
)))
RE = (1− β (1− Pm)− (1 − β)Pf )
(
1−H
(
βPmPe|m
1− β (1− Pm)− (1− β)Pf
))
Proof: Please refer to Appendix G.
In the randomized scheduling approach, each node will transmit its message during randomly selected time
intervals, where a single node’s transmitter is active in any given time interval with probability Pt, and the transmit
power level is randomly selected according to the distribution f . Consequently, there are four possible states of both
transmitters in any particular time interval i. Due to our noiseless assumption, the eavesdropper’s antenna will easily
identify silence intervals. Eve’s challenge, however, is to differentiate between the other three states. Let A and B
represent the transmission event of Alice and Bob, respectively. Similarly, Ac and Bc are the complementary events.
Finally, we let E1 → E2 to denote the occurrence of event E1 and its classification by Eve as event E2, and denote
the probability of error given that the event (A,B) was mistaken for (A,Bc) by the classifier as Pe|(A,B)→(A,Bc).
The following is the achievable secrecy rate with the two-way randomization approach.
Theorem 4: Using the two-way randomized scheduling and power allocation protocol, the following secrecy rate
is achievable at each user.
Rs = max
Pt,f
(min
θ,C
([RM −max(REA, REB)]+)),
where
RM = Pt (1− Pt)
(
1−H
(
1− φ
(√
ρmin
dAB
α
)))
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REA = DA
(
1−H
(
P
(EA)
e
DA
))
REB = DB
(
1−H
(
P
(EB)
e
DB
))
DA = P
2
t P(A,B)→(A,Bc) + Pt (1− Pt)P(Ac,B)→(A,Bc) + Pt (1− Pt)
(
1− P(A,Bc)→(Ac,B) − P(A,Bc)→(A,B)
)
DB = P
2
t P(A,B)→(Ac,B) + Pt (1− Pt)P(A,Bc)→(Ac,B) + Pt (1− Pt)
(
1− P(Ac,B)→(A,Bc) − P(Ac,B)→(A,B)
)
P
(EA)
e = P 2t P(A,B)→(A,Bc)Pe|(A,B)→(A,Bc) + 0.5Pt (1− Pt)P(Ac,B)→(A,Bc)
P
(EB)
e = P 2t P(A,B)→(Ac,B)Pe|(A,B)→(Ac,B) + 0.5Pt (1− Pt)P(A,Bc)→(Ac,B)
and DA, DB represent the portion of symbols classified by Eve as being transmitted by Alice or Bob respectively.
Proof: Please refer to Appendix H.
One can argue that the achievable secrecy rate increases as rE increases. The reason is that a large rE will impair
Eve’s ability to differentiate between the symbols transmitted by Bob and Alice. The following result characterizes
the secrecy rate achievable in the asymptotic scenario when rE >> dAB .
Corollary 5: Let Rmax be the achievable secrecy rate using the randomized scheduling and power allocation
scheme when rE →∞. Then,
Rmax = max
Pt
([RM − (1− (1 − Pt)2)(1−H(0.25))]+), (10)
where
RM = Pt (1− Pt)
(
1−H
(
1− φ
(√
ρmin
dAB
α
)))
Proof: Please refer to Appendix I.
A. Numerical Results
In our numerical examples, we assume a uniform power distribution for both Alice and Bob, and a threshold-based
energy classifier is used by Eve. Because we assume that all channels are noiseless, Eve can successfully decode the
received symbols, corresponding to concurrent transmissions, as the symbols with the higher received signal power.
Also, the received signal powers in all transmission scenarios are known a priori, where a transmission scenario
is defined by the set of active transmitters and the selected power levels. Based on the received signal power, the
transmission scenario is detected by Eve, and hence the set of active transmitters. In case two or more transmission
scenarios result in the same received signal power, a random choice is made with equal probabilities given to all
possible scenarios. To simplify the calculations, we further assume that Alice and Bob use sufficient error control
coding to overcome the additive noise effect. More precisely, Alice and Bob are assumed to use asymptotically
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optimal forward error control coding and that their received SNR is above the minimal level required to achieve
arbitrarily vanishing probability of error.
Fig. 5 reports the achievable secrecy rate Rs of Theorems 3 and 4 at different values for the distance ratio dmindmax
(dmin = min(dAE , dBE), dmax = max(dAE , dBE)). A few remarks are now in order.
1) The two-way randomization scheme achieves higher rates than the TDM scheme. The reason is the added
ambiguity at Eve resulting from the randomization in the scheduling algorithm.
2) The lower secrecy rates for smaller values of dmindmax is due to Eve’s enhanced ability to capture the symbols
transmitted by the node closer to her.
3) The rates plotted in Fig. 5 were found to be very close to those of a classifier that does not erase any received
symbols, i.e., transmission scenarios corresponding to concurrent transmissions are not considered.
B. Experimental Results
We implemented our experiments on TinyOS [21] using TelosB motes [22], which have a built-in CC2420 radio
module [23]. The CC2420 module uses the IEEE 802.15.4 standards in the 2.4 GHZ band [24]. Our setup consists
of four nodes, equivalent to Alice, Bob, Eve, and a Gateway module. The Gateway acts as a link between the
sensor network and a PC running a java program. Our experiment is divided into cycles. During each cycle, the PC
works as an orchestrator, through the Gateway, that determines, using a special message (TRIGGER-MSG), whether
Alice should send alone, Bob sends alone, or both send concurrently. It also determines the power level used for
transmission. These decisions are based on the transmission probability Pt. Upon receiving the broadcast TRIGGER-
MSG, each trusted node transmits a DATA-MSG while Eve will start to continuously read the value in the Received
Signal Strength Indicator (RSSI) register (the RSSI value read by the CC2420 module is a moving average of the last
8 received symbols [23].). Eve then transfers the RSSI readings from the memory buffer to the Gateway node which
will forward them to the PC in an RSSI-MSG. For each cycle, the java program stores the received RSSI readings for
further processing by the energy classifier (implemented in MATLAB). When transmitting data messages (DATA-
MSG) from Alice or Bob, each node constructs a random payload of 100 bytes using the RandomMlcg component
of TinyOS, which uses the Park-Miller Minimum Standard Generator. Each symbol is O-QPSK modulated [24]
representing 4 bits of the data. We also had to remove the CSMA-CA mechanism from the CC2420 driver in order
to allow both Alice and Bob to transmit concurrently. Finally, it is worth noting that the orchestrator was used to
overcome the synchronization challenge in our experimental set-up. In practical implementations, Bob (or Alice)
could start jamming the channel upon receiving the Start of Frame Delimiter (SFD).
In our implementation of the energy classifier, the discrete nature of the transmit power levels is taken into
consideration. First, the eavesdropper was given the advantage of having the classifier trained on a set of readings
taken by running the experiment in the same environment and at the same node locations as those for which the
classifier would be later used. In the training phase, our classifier is given prior information on the configuration,
power levels selected for each node, and the measured RSSI readings at each cycle. It then finds the mean and
variance of the measured RSSI values for each transmitted power level for Alice and Bob when each of them sends
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alone in a cycle. Any received symbol is classified as being transmitted by either of the communicating nodes. This
choice is based on our third observation on the rates plotted in Fig. 5. When running the classifier, a maximum
likelihood rule is employed, where the following expression is evaluated,
maxi fAi(y)
maxi fBi(y)
A
≷
B
1
and the symbol is classified accordingly, where fXi(y) is the value of the approximated Gaussian distribution of
measured RSSI values when source X is the only transmitter with power level i. In a practical implementation, the
length of a cycle is the duration of a single symbol, and hence, in our setup the classifier bases its decision on a
single RSSI reading. In evaluating the classifier performance, we use the transmission scenario indicating the actual
status of the transmitters in each cycle and compare them with the classification results to obtain the probability of
each possible misclassification event. We also assume that, in case of concurrent transmission, Eve can correctly
decode the symbol received with the higher signal power, as suggested in [25]. This assumption is used to calculate
the values of Pe|(A,B)→(A,Bc) and Pe|(A,B)→(Ac,B). We also use the same set of data to train and run a classifier for
the TDM protocol described above. Here, we only consider cycles when Alice’s transmitter is active, and consider
Bob’s concurrent transmission as jamming.
Our experiments were conducted in a hallway environment, where only few scatterers exist (only the wall
structure). We train, run, and evaluate our energy classifier, then use the resulting probabilities in the rate expressions
of Theorem 3 and Theorem 4 to find the achievable secrecy rates. Figs. 6 and 7 report these results in two
representative configurations. In the first, Alice and Bob are placed at the same location with dAE = dBE = 20ft,
whereas dAE = 1ft and dBE = 20ft in the second. We note that the measured difference of received signal
power values from both transmitting nodes was found to be 2dB and 19dB for Configurations 1 and 2, respectively.
This implies that the maximum rates in Fig. 7 and Fig. 6 should be compared to the value of Rs in Fig. 5 at
dmin
dmax
= 0.79 and 0.11 respectively. We believe that this difference between the theoretical and experimental results
can be attributed to hardware differences and the deviation of the actual channel from the simplistic free space
model used in our derivations. More specifically, we observe that the maximum secrecy rates for the two-way
randomized scheduling scheme in our experimental results is slightly lower than those calculated numerically. The
reason is Eve’s enhanced ability to distinguish between the two sources of transmission due to the discrete nature
of the selected transmit power values. Nevertheless, the experimental results establish the ability of our two-way
randomized scheduling and power allocation scheme to achieve perfect secrecy in practical near field communication
scenarios where the distance between Eve and legitimate nodes will be larger than the inter-node distance, even if
Eve is equipped with a very large receive antenna.
V. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we used the cooperative binning and channel prefixing approach to obtain achievable secrecy rates for
both the discrete memoryless and Gaussian full-duplex two-way wiretap channels. In the proposed scheme, channel
prefixing is used to create an advantage for the legitimate terminals over the eavesdropper which is transformed
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by the binning codebooks into a non-trivial secrecy rate region. A private key sharing and encryption was used
to distribute the secure sum rate between the two users. We then introduced the idea of randomized scheduling
and established its fundamental role in the half-duplex two-way wiretap channel. Our theoretical analysis revealed
the ability of the proposed randomization approach to achieve relatively high secure transmission rates under mild
conditions on the eavesdropper location. The ambiguity introduced at the eavesdropper by randomized scheduling
was further validated by numerical results and extensive experimental results using IEEE 802.15.4-enabled sensor
boards in near field communication scenarios.
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APPENDIX A
PROOF OF THEOREM 1
First, we fix the probability density function P (q), then generate a sequence qn′ , where the entries are i.i.d.,
and each entry is randomly chosen according to P (q). The sequence qn′ is then given to all nodes before the
communication takes place.
Codebook Generation:
Consider user i ∈ {1, 2} that has a secret message wi ∈ Mi = {1, 2, ...,Mi}, and a private key wki ∈ Mki =
{1, 2, ...,Mki }. For a given distribution P (ui|q) and the sequence q, generate Mui i.i.d. sequences un
′
i (w
u
i ), where
wui ∈ [1, · · · ,Mui = 2n
′Ru
i ]. For each codeword un′i (wui ), generate M siMki MoiMxi = 2n
′(Rs
i
+Rk
i
+Ro
i
+Rx
i
−ǫ0) i.i.d.
sequences cn′i , where Mi = M siMoi Mui , and P (cn
′
i |un
′
i ) =
∏n′
t=1 P (ci(t)|ui(t)). Randomly distribute these into
double indexed bins, where each bin has MoiMxi = 2n
′(Ro
i
+Rx
i
−ǫ0) codewords, and is indexed by the tuple (wsi , wki ),
wsi ∈ {1, · · · ,M si = 2n
′Rs
i }, woi ∈ {1, · · · ,Moi = 2n
′Ro
i }, and wxi ∈ {1, · · · ,Mxi = 2n
′Rx
i }. These codewords are
represented by cn′i (wui , wsi , wki , woi , wxi ).
Encoding: We use a block encoding scheme, where the full message is transmitted over B blocks, each of length
n′, and n = n′B. In the rest of the proof, we use bold face letters to represent vectors of block length n′. In each
block, each user will transmit a private key in addition to its message, and the other user will use this private key in
the next block to secure its message fully or in part. We omit the block indices for readability. In any given block,
user 1 will send the corresponding block messages of w1 ∈M1 and the randomly selected wk1 ∈Mk1 . The message
index (w1) is used to select a tuple (ws1, w˜u1 , w˜o1), where w˜u1 and w˜o1 are encrypted into wu1 and wo1 , respectively,
using the private key w¯k2 = [w¯k12 , w¯k22 ] received from the other user in the previous block. In other words, let b˜u1 ,
b˜o1, b
u
1 , b
o
1, b¯
k1
2 , and b¯k22 be the binary representations of w˜u1 , w˜o1 , wu1 , wo1 , w¯k12 , and w¯k22 respectively. Then,
bu
1
= b˜u
1
⊕ b¯k1
2
, and bo
1
= b˜o
1
⊕ b¯k2
2
. Here, wu1 is used to select the cloud center of the super position coding (see,
e.g., [26]), (ws1, wk1 ) is used to select the bin index, and the codeword index within the bin is given by (wo1 , wx1 ),
where wx1 is randomly selected according to a uniform distribution. (Note that, due to one time pad, wo1 is also
uniformly distributed.) Thus the corresponding codeword cn′1 (wu1 , ws1, wk1 , wo1, wx1 ) is selected. Then, the channel
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input, xn′1 , is generated using the distribution P (x1|c1). A similar encoding scheme is employed at user 2. As the
messages transmitted in different blocks are independent, satisfying the reliability and security constraints for each
block guarantees their application for all messages transmitted in an arbitrarily large number of blocks.
Decoding:
Consider a message yn′1 received at the receiver of user 1. Let An
′
1,ǫ be the set of weakly typical (qn
′
,un
′
2 (w
u
2 ),
cn
′
2 (w
u
2 , w
s
2, w
k
2 , w
o
2, w
x
2 ),y
n′
1 ) sequences. As n′ →∞, the decoder will select (wu2 , ws2, wk2 , wo2, wx2 ) such that,
(qn
′
,un
′
2 (w
u
2 ), c
n′
2 (w
u
2 , w
s
2, w
k
2 , w
o
2, w
x
2 ),y
n′
1 ,x
n′
1 ) ∈ An
′
1,ǫ
if such a tuple exists and is unique. Otherwise, the decoder declares an error. Note that the decoder’s estimate wˆ2
is determined by (ws2, wu2 , wo2, w¯k1 ), where w¯k1 is the private key sent by user 1 in the previous block. Decoding at
receiver 2 is symmetric and can be described by reversing the indices 1 and 2 above.
Probability of Error Analysis:
It follows by the proof of the capacity of the point to point DMC [1] that for any given ǫ > 0, receiver 1 can
decode the corresponding messages with Pe,2 < ǫ for sufficiently large n′, if
Rs2 +R
k
2 +R
o
2 +R
x
2 ≤ I(C2;Y1|X1, U2, Q) (11)
Ru2 +R
s
2 +R
k
2 +R
o
2 +R
x
2 ≤ I(U2, C2;Y1|X1, Q) (12)
By symmetry, a similar condition applies to receiver 2 to have Pe,1 < ǫ, i.e.,
Rs1 +R
k
1 +R
o
1 +R
x
1 ≤ I(C1;Y2|X2, U1, Q) (13)
Ru1 +R
s
1 +R
k
1 +R
o
1 +R
x
1 ≤ I(U1, C1;Y2|X2, Q) (14)
Equivocation Computation: Consider the following argument.
H(W k1 ,W
s
1 ,W
k
2 ,W
s
2 |Z)
(a)
≥ H(W k1 ,W s1 ,W k2 ,W s2 |Z,U1,U2,Q)
= H(W k1 ,W
s
1 ,W
k
2 ,W
s
2 ,Z|U1,U2,Q)−H(Z|U1,U2,Q)
= H(W k1 ,W
s
1 ,W
k
2 ,W
s
2 ,C1,C2,Z|U1,U2,Q)−H(Z|U1,U2,Q)
−H(C1,C2|W k1 ,W s1 ,W k2 ,W s2 ,Z,U1,U2,Q)
= H(Z|C1,C2,W k1 ,W s1 ,W k2 ,W s2 ,U1,U2,Q)
+H(W k1 ,W
s
1 ,W
k
2 ,W
s
2 ,C1,C2|U1,U2,Q)
−H(Z|U1,U2,Q)−H(C1,C2|W k1 ,W s1 ,W k2 ,W s2 ,Z,U1,U2,Q)
(b)
= [H(Z|C1,C2,U1,U2,Q)−H(Z|U1,U2,Q)] +H(C1,C2|U1,U2,Q)
−H(C1,C2|W k1 ,W s1 ,W k2 ,W s2 ,Z,U1,U2,Q)
(c)
≥ −n′I(C1, C2;Z|U1, U2, Q)− n′ǫ1 +H(C1,C2|U1,U2,Q)
−H(C1,C2|W k1 ,W s1 ,W k2 ,W s2 ,Z,U1,U2,Q), (15)
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where (a) follows from the fact that conditioning does not increase the entropy, (b) follows from the fact that, given
U1,U2,Q, (W
k
1 ,W
s
1 ,W
k
2 ,W
s
2 )→ (C1,C2)→ (Z) is a Markov Chain, and (c) follows from I(C1,C2;Z|U1,U2,Q)
≤ n′I(C1, C2;Z|U1, U2, Q)+n′ǫ1 with ǫ1 → 0 as n′ →∞ for a discrete memoryless channel (see, e.g., [3, Lemma
8]).
Here,
H(C1,C2|U1,U2,Q) = n′(Rk1 +Rs1 +Ro1 +Rx1 +Rk2 +Rs2 +Ro2 +Rx2 − 2ǫ0), (16)
as, given (U1,U2,Q) = (u1,u2,q), the tuple (C1,C2) has 2n
′(Rk
1
+Rs
1
+Ro
1
+Rx
1
+Rk
2
+Rs
2
+Ro
2
+Rx
2
−2ǫ0) possible values
each with equal probability, and,
H(C1,C2|W k1 = wk1 ,W s1 = ws1,W k2 = wk2 ,W s2 = ws2,Z,U1 = u1,U2 = u2,Q = q) ≤ n′ǫ2
for ǫ2 → 0 as n′ →∞. This follows from the Fano’s inequality, as the eavesdropper can decode the randomization
indices (wo1 , wx1 , wo2, wx2 ) given (wk1 , ws1, wk2 , ws2) if the following conditions are satisfied.
Ro1 +R
x
1 ≤ I(C1;Z|C2, U1, U2, Q) (17)
Ro2 +R
x
2 ≤ I(C2;Z|C1, U1, U2, Q) (18)
Ro1 +R
x
1 +R
o
2 +R
x
2 ≤ I(C1, C2;Z|U1, U2, Q) (19)
By averaging over W k1 , W s1 , W k2 , W s2 , U1, U2, and Q, we obtain
H(C1,C2|W k1 ,W s1 ,W k2 ,W s2 ,Z,U1,U2,Q) ≤ n′ǫ2, (20)
Now, once we set,
Ro1 +R
x
1 +R
o
2 +R
x
2 = I(C1, C2;Z|U1, U2, Q), (21)
and combine (15), (16), (20), and (21), we obtain
1
n′
H(W k1 ,W
s
1 ,W
k
2 ,W
s
2 |Z) ≥ Rk1 +Rs1 +Rk2 +Rs2 − (ǫ1 + ǫ2 + 2ǫ0)
and (ǫ1 + ǫ2 + 2ǫ0)→ 0 as n′ →∞.
Since w¯k2 (w¯k1 ) is used as a private key to secure the part of the message carried in wu1 , wo1 (wu2 , wo2, respectively)
with the one-time-padded scheme, the secrecy constraint
1
n′
H(W1,W2|Z) ≥ R1 +R2 − ǫ
is satisfied (see [2]) if
Ru1 +R
o
1 ≤ Rk2 (22)
Ru2 +R
o
2 ≤ Rk1 (23)
where we set R1 = Ru1 +Ro1 +Rs1 and R2 = Ru1 +Ro2 +Rs2.
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Finally, we note that Ru1 = Ru2 = Ro1 = Ro2 = 0 for the first block. However, the impact of this condition on the
achievable rate diminishes as the number of blocks B →∞. The region achieved by the proposed scheme is given
by (11), (12), (13), (14), (17), (18), (19), (22), and (23).
APPENDIX B
PROOF OF THEOREM 2
For a given distribution p ∈ PF , let
I6 , I(C1;Y2|X2, Q)− I(C1;Z|Q),
I7 , I(C2;Y1|X1, Q)− I(C2;Z|Q),
and
I8 , I(C1;Y2|X2, Q) + I(C2;Y1|X1, Q)− I(C1, C2;Z|Q).
If I8 < 0, we set R1 = R2 = 0. Hence, we only focus on cases for which I8 ≥ 0. This implies that I6 ≥ 0
and/or I7 ≥ 0. (As I6 < 0 and I7 < 0 implies that I8 < 0.) We detail the proof for the following cases.
Case 1: I6 ≥ 0 and I7 ≥ 0 for the given p ∈ PF .
We set U1, U2 as deterministic and Ru1 = Ru2 = 0 in Theorem 1, and obtain that
Rs1 +R
k
1 +R
o
1 +R
x
1 ≤ I(C1;Y2|X2, Q) , I1 (24)
Rs2 +R
k
2 +R
o
2 +R
x
2 ≤ I(C2;Y1|X1, Q) , I2 (25)
Ro1 +R
x
1 ≤ I(C1;Z|C2, Q) , I3 (26)
Ro2 +R
x
2 ≤ I(C2;Z|C1, Q) , I4 (27)
Ro1 +R
x
1 +R
o
2 +R
x
2 = I(C1, C2;Z|Q) , I5 (28)
Ro1 ≤ Rk2 (29)
Ro2 ≤ Rk1 (30)
As I6 ≥ 0, I7 ≥ 0, and I8 ≥ 0, we can choose the rates as follows:
• If I(C2;Y1|X1, Q) ≥ I(C2;Z|C1, Q), then we choose
Rk1 = 0, R
o
1 = R
k
2 , R
x
1 = [I(C1, C2;Z|Q)− I(C2;Y1|X1, Q)]+,
Rs1 = I(C1;Y2|X2, Q)−Rk2 − [I(C1, C2;Z|Q)− I(C2;Y1|X1, Q)]+,
Rk2 = I(C1;Z|Q)− [I(C1, C2;Z|Q)− I(C2;Y1|X1, Q)]+, Ro2 = 0, Rx2 = I(C1, C2;Z|Q)−Rk2 −Rx1 ,
Rs2 = [I(C2;Y1|X1, Q)− I(C1, C2;Z|Q)]+.
• If I(C2;Y1|X1, Q) < I(C2;Z|C1, Q), then we choose
Rs1 = I(C1;Y2|X2, Q)−I(C1, C2;Z|Q)+I(C2;Y1|X1, Q), Rx1 = I(C1, C2;Z|Q)−Rx2 , Rx2 = I(C2;Y1|X1, Q),
and the remaining rates equal to zero.
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These choice of non-negative rates satisfy conditions in (24)-(30), and hence we can achieve the rate pair
(R1 = I1 − [I5 − I2]+, R2 = [I2 − I5]+).
Similarly, by reversing the indices above, the rate pair
(R1 = [I1 − I5]+, R2 = I2 − [I5 − I1]+)
is achievable. Now, combining these two achievable points we obtain the following achievable region: The set of
non-negative (R1, R2) pairs satisfying
R1 ≤ I1
R2 ≤ I2
R1 +R2 ≤ I1 + I2 − I5
are achievable.
Case 2: I6 ≥ 0 and I7 < 0 for the given p ∈ PF .
We set U1 and C2 as deterministic and choose the following rates in Theorem 1 (other rates are chosen to be 0).
Rk1 = I(C1;Y2|X2, Q)− I(C1;Z|U2, Q)−Rs1
Rs1 ≤ I(C1;Y2|X2, Q)− I(C1;Z|U2, Q)
Rx1 = I(C1;Z|U2, Q)
Ru2 = min{I(U2;Y1|X1, Q), Rk1}
For the given p ∈ PF with I6 ≥ 0 and I7 < 0, the following region is achievable.
R1 ≤ I(C1;Y2|X2, Q)
R2 ≤ I(U2;Y1|X1, Q)
R1 +R2 ≤ I(C1;Y2|X2, Q)− I(C1;Z|U2, Q)
Note that the above region is the same as the one in the theorem statement, with the random variable U2 taking
the role of C2. Case 3: I6 < 0 and I7 ≥ 0 for the given p ∈ PF .
Reversing the indices everywhere in case 2 above, we obtain the following achievable region
R1 ≤ I(C1;Y2|X2, Q)
R2 ≤ I(C2;Y1|X1, Q)
R1 +R2 ≤ I(C2;Y1|X1, Q)− I(C2;Z|C1, Q)
Combining the above cases completes the proof.
Remark 2: The above scheme either uses the one time padded private key as one of the two selectors for the
randomization index (Case 1), or does not employ the random binning coding scheme and only uses the private
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key at one of the user (User 2 in Case 2, and User 1 in Case 3). Hence, no superposition coding is present. We
should also note that the achievable rates proved above in Cases 2 and 3, can be higher than that of the statement.
However, as already mentioned, we only use this Theorem as a simple special case of Theorem 1.
APPENDIX C
PROOF OF COROLLARY 1
We set |Q| = 1 in Theorem 2 and take the convex hull of the achievable rates. We compute the following terms.
I(C1;Y2|X2, Q) = H(Y2|X2)−H(Y2|C1, X2)
≤ 1−H(ǫˆ2) (31)
I(C2;Y1|X1, Q) = H(Y1|X1)−H(Y1|C2, X1)
≤ 1−H(ǫˆ1) (32)
I(C1;Y2|X2, Q) + I(C2;Y1|X1, Q)− I(C1, C2;Z|Q) = (H(Y1|X1) +H(Y2|X2)−H(Z))
+ (H(Z|C1, C2)−H(Y1|C2, X1)−H(Y2|C1, X2))
By noting that,
H(Y1|X1) +H(Y2|X2)−H(Z) = (H(X2 ⊕N1) +H(X1 ⊕N2)−H(X1 ⊕X2 ⊕Ne))
(a)
= H(X2 ⊕N1) +H(X1 ⊕N2)−H(X2 ⊕N1 ⊕X1 ⊕N2 ⊕ Nˆe)
(b)
≤ H(X2 ⊕N1) +H(X1 ⊕N2)−H(X2 ⊕N1 ⊕X1 ⊕N2)
= H(X2 ⊕N1) +H((X2 ⊕N1 ⊕X1 ⊕N2)|(X2 ⊕N1))
−H(X2 ⊕N1 ⊕X1 ⊕N2)
= H((X2 ⊕N1), (X2 ⊕N1 ⊕X1 ⊕N2))−H(X2 ⊕N1 ⊕X1 ⊕N2)
= H((X2 ⊕N1)|(X2 ⊕N1 ⊕X1 ⊕N2))
≤ 1
where (a) follows by setting Nˆe = N1 ⊕ N2 ⊕ Ne, (b) follows from the fact that conditioning does not increase
entropy, we conclude that,
I(C1;Y2|X2, Q) + I(C2;Y1|X1, Q)− I(C1, C2;Z|Q) ≤ 1 +H(ǫˆe)−H(ǫˆ1)−H(ǫˆ2), (33)
The proof is complete by combining the terms in (31), (32), and (33) with Theorem 2. We note that equality
applies in the three mentioned terms when the variables C1, C2 are drawn from the uniform distribution over {0, 1}.
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APPENDIX D
THE REGION RFG INCLUDES THAT OF [13]
We utilize the time sharing parameter as follows. Let Q = {1, 2}, where q = 1 with prob. (1 − α) and q = 2
with prob. α. The remaining distributions are as follows.
• For q = 1, we set C1 as deterministic and X1 = N¯1 for channel prefixing. C2 and N¯1 are generated with full
powers P2 and P1, respectively.
• For q = 2, we set C2 as deterministic and X2 = N¯2 for channel prefixing. C1 and N¯2 are generated with full
powers P1 and P2, respectively.
With this choice the region in Theorem 2 reduces to the following:
R1 ≤ I(C1;Y2|X2, Q) = αγ(P1)
R2 ≤ I(C2;Y1|X1, Q) = (1 − α)γ(P2)
R1 +R2 ≤ I(C1;Y2|X2, Q) + I(C2;Y1|X1, Q)− I(C1, C2;Z|Q)
= αγ(P1) + (1− α)γ(P2)− αγ
(
ge1P1
1 + ge2P2
)
− (1− α)γ
(
ge2P2
1 + ge1P1
)
Let
RK , γ(P2)− γ
(
ge2P2
1 + ge1P1
)
,
and
R1(α) ,
[
αγ(P1)−
[
αγ
(
ge1P1
1 + ge2P2
)
− (1− α)RK
]+]+
.
If RK ≤ 0, then R∗1 = γ(ρ1)− γ( ge1ρ11+ge2ρ2 ) is achieved by setting α = 1 in the above region. If RK > 0, then the
rate R1(α) is achievable. As R∗1 = max
α∈[0,1]
R1(α) for RK > 0, the point [R∗1, 0] is achievable. The achievability of
[0, R∗2] can be obtained similarly, and hence, the region of Theorem 2 includes that of [13].
APPENDIX E
SKETCH OF THE PROOF OF COROLLARY 4
The channel P ∗(y1, y2, z|x1, x2) with states 4 given to users reduces to the following equivalent channel.
P ∗∗(y1, y2, z|x1, x2) =


P (y2, z|x1, x2 =?)1{y1,?}, for state 1
P (y1, z|x1 =?, x2)1{y2,?}, for state 2
P (z|x1, x2)1{y1,?}1{y2,?}, for state 3
1{y1,?}1{y2,?}1{z,?}, for state 4,
Note that P ∗∗(y1, y2, z|x1, x2) is not equivalent to P ∗(y1, y2, z|x1, x2). We describe coding scheme for the
channel P ∗∗. The channel P ∗∗ will be equivalent to P ∗, if the nodes can classify the state 4 of the channel.
We first consider the channel between x1 and y2 over a block of n′ channel uses. There are P1(1−P2)n′ symbols
for which the channel is in state 1 (law of large numbers). The symbols for state 2 have y2 =? are deleted. (These
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correspond to symbols that have x1 =?.) The symbols corresponding to state 3 of the channel can be modeled
as random erasures. (There are P1P2n′ such symbols with high probability as n′ gets large.) Finally, the channel
outputs corresponding to state 4 will be erased (as there is no transmission from user 1). Therefore we consider
coding over [P1(1 − P2) + P1P2]n′ symbols between x1 and y2, for which P1P2n′ symbols are erasures (as n′
gets large).
We first define the followings.
n1 = P1(1− P2)n′
n2 = (1− P1)P2n′
n3 = P1P2n
′
n4 = (1− P1)(1 − P2)n′
In the codebook design, we generate 2n′(Rk1+Rs1+Ro1+Rx1 ) codewords denoted by cn1+n31 of length n1+n3. For each
symbol time, with probability (1−P1) we input x1 =? (no transmission event), and with probability P1 we generate
the channel input x1 according to P (x1|c1) using the next symbol in cn1+n31 . If there is no remaining symbols in
cn1+n31 , we input x1 =? (the effect of this diminishes as n′ gets large). Similarly, we generate 2n
′(Rk
2
+Rs
2
+Ro
2
+Rx
2
)
codewords denoted by cn2+n32 of length n2 + n3, and map it to xn
′
2 .
For the decodability, the typical set decoding is employed. For example, the decoder 2 will select (wk1 , ws1, wo1, wx1 )
such that,
(qn
′
, cn1+n31 (w
k
1 , w
s
1, w
o
1, w
x
1 ),y
n1+n3
2 ) ∈ An1+n31,ǫ (state 1).
Here, the remaining symbols in yn′2 are deleted as they are equal to ?. The equivalent channel is the random
mapping of cn1+n31 to x
n1+n3
1 , from which n3 symbols are randomly erased and the remaining ones generate y
n1
2 .
Here the error probability (averaged over the ensemble) can be made small, if
Rk1 +R
s
1 +R
o
1 +R
x
1 ≤
n1
n′
I(C1;Y2|X2, Q, state 1) (34)
Rk2 +R
s
2 +R
o
2 +R
x
2 ≤
n2
n′
I(C2;Y1|X1, Q, state 2) (35)
To show that the secrecy constraint is satisfied, we follow the steps similar to that of Appendix A. Due to key
sharing it suffices to show
1
n′
H(W k1 ,W
s
1 ,W
k
2 ,W
s
2 |Zn
′
) ≥ Rk1 +Rs1 +Rk2 +Rs2 − ǫ,
for sufficiently large n′, together with
Ro1 ≤ Rk2 , and (36)
Ro2 ≤ Rk1 . (37)
Here, the latter is used to ensure that there are sufficient number of key bits (from the previous block) to secure
messages that are carried in the open part (of the current block), and the former is satisfied (from the equivocation
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computation provided in Appendix A) if the rates satisfy the followings.
Ro1 +R
x
1 ≤
n1 + n2
n′
I(C1;Z|C2, state 1 or 2) + n3
n′
I(C1;Z|C2, state 3) (38)
Ro2 +R
x
2 ≤
n1 + n2
n′
I(C2;Z|C1, state 1 or 2) + n3
n′
I(C2;Z|C1, state 3) (39)
Ro1 +R
x
1 +R
o
2 +R
x
2 =
n1 + n2
n′
I(C1, C2;Z|state 1 or 2) + n3
n′
I(C1, C2;Z|state 3), (40)
Then the region obtained by equations (34), (35), (36), (37), (38), (39), and (40) can be simplified (using the
same steps given in Appendix B) to obtain the stated result.
APPENDIX F
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 1
The proof follows by Corollary 4, where we set |Q| = 1 and compute the followings.
I(C1;Y2|X2, Q, state 1) = H(µˆ2)−H(ǫˆ2)
I(C2;Y1|X1, Q, state 2) = H(µˆ1)−H(ǫˆ1)
and the eavesdropper’s observed information is given by,
I(C1, C2;Z|state 3) = H(µˆe)−H(ǫˆe)
I(C1, C2;Z|state 1 or 2) =
(
H(µe1d1 + µe2d2)− 0.5H(d1ǫe1 + d2ǫe2)− 0.5H(d1(1− ǫe1) + d2ǫe2)
)
,
where the last equality is a direct results of the following computation.
H(Z|C1 = 0, C2 = 0) = H(d1ǫe1 + d2ǫe2)
H(Z|C1 = 1, C2 = 1) = H(Z|C1 = 0, C2 = 0)
H(Z|C1 = 1, C2 = 0) = H(d1(1− ǫe1) + d2ǫe2)
H(Z|C1 = 0, C2 = 1) = H(Z|C1 = 1, C2 = 0)
APPENDIX G
PROOF OF THEOREM 3
Consider the time intervals when Alice is transmitting codewords to Bob. Let αM , αE denote the fraction of
symbols erased at Bob and Eve, and Pe(M), P (E)e denote the probability of erroneously decoding a received symbol
given that it was not erased at Bob and Eve, respectively. By applying the appropriate random binning scheme [3],
the following secrecy rate is achievable ( [5], Theorem 3).
R = max
P (x)
{
[I(X ;Y )− I(X ;Z)]+} ,
where X denotes the input, Y and Z denote the outputs at Bob and Eve, respectively. Considering the transition
model for this channel, we see
H(Y |X) = H(αM ) + (1− αM )H(Pe(M)).
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Now, let Pr{X(t) =√ρ(t)} = Π and Pr{X(t) = −√ρ(t)} = 1−Π. Then,
H(Y ) = H(αM ) + (1− αM )H(Π(1 − Pe(M)) + (1 −Π)Pe(M)),
and maxΠH(Y ) = H(αM ) + (1− αM ) when Π = 0.5. This results in
max
P (x)
I(X ;Y ) = max
P (x)
(H(Y )−H(Y |X)) = (1− αM )(1 −H(Pe(M)))
Similarly, max
P (x)
I(X ;Z) = (1− αE)(1 −H(P (E)e )).
Following the half-duplex assumption, all data symbols transmitted during the same time interval of a feedback
transmission will be considered as erasures at the legitimate receiver’s channel. Therefore, as the frame length
T → ∞, αM = β. For the rest of the symbols, the probability of symbol error by the hard decision detector will
be
Pe
(M)(t) = 1− φ


√
ρ(t)
dAB
α

 .
On the other hand, feedback transmissions will introduce decoding errors at Eve. Noting that 1 − Pm of those
corrupted symbols will be detected by the energy classifier, we get
αE = β(1 − Pm) + (1− β)Pf
P (E)e =
βPmPe|m
1− αE .
Combining these results, we obtain
max
P (x)
I(X ;Y ) = (1 − β)
(
1−H
(
1
T
T∑
t=1
Pe
(M)(t)
))
≥ (1 − β)
(
1−H
(
1− φ
(√
ρmin
dAB
α
)))
, RM
and denoting RE , (1 − αE)(1−H(P (E)e )), we have max
P (x)
I(X ;Z) = RE , and
R = max
P (x)
([I(X ;Y )− I(X ;Z)]+) ≥ [max
P (x)
I(X ;Y )−max
P (x)
I(X ;Z)]+ ≥ [RM −RE ]+.
Finally, we consider a max-min strategy whereby the legitimate receiver assumes that the eavesdropper chooses its
position around the perimeter of the circle and the energy classifier’s mechanism C to minimize the secrecy rate
Rs. Accordingly, the legitimate receiver determines the probability of random feedback transmission β and both
the data and feedback signal power distributions f1 and f2 to maximize this worst case value (note that the rate is
scaled by 0.5 to account for the time division between the two nodes). We obtain
Rs = 0.5 max
β,f1,f2
{
min
θ,C
R
}
.
October 30, 2018 DRAFT
29
APPENDIX H
PROOF OF THEOREM 4
Due to symmetry, we only consider the secrecy rate of Alice’s message to Bob. Following the previous proof,
we have the following achievable secrecy rate,
R = [(1− αM )(1 −H(Pe(M)))− (1 − αE)(1−H(Pe(E)))]+,
where αM , αE denote the fraction of symbols erased at Bob and Eve, and Pe(M), P (E)e denote the probability of
erroneously decoding a received symbol given that it was not erased at Bob and Eve, respectively. Using half-duplex
antennas, each node will be able to decode a symbol transmitted by the other node only when its own transmitter
is idle and the other node’s transmitter is active. These two conditions are simultaneously satisfied with probability
Pt(1− Pt) yielding αM = 1− Pt(1− Pt). We also see that
Pe
(M)(t) = 1− φ


√
ρ(t)
dAB
α

 .
The symbols classified by Eve as being transmitted by Alice can belong to one of three categories. The first, which
takes place with probability Pt (1− Pt)
(
1− P(A,Bc)→(Ac,B) − P(A,Bc)→(A,B)
)
, represents the portion successfully
detected and correctly decoded by Eve. The second corresponds to symbols transmitted by Bob and misclassified
as belonging to Alice; with probability Pt (1− Pt)P(Ac,B)→(A,Bc). Those symbols are independent from the ones
transmitted by Alice, and hence, have a probability 0.5 of being different. The third category, with probability
P 2t P(A,B)→(A,Bc), corresponds to concurrent transmissions that are not erased by Eve’s classifier and misclassified
as Alice’s symbols. The probability of error in these symbols is denoted by Pe|(A,B)→(A,Bc). Combining these, we
get
αE = 1−DA
P (E)e =
P
(EA)
e
1− αE
R =
[
(1− αM )(1 −H(Pe(M)))− (1− αE)
(
1−H
(
P (E)e
))]+
≥
[
Pt(1− Pt)
(
1−H
(
1− φ
(√
ρmin
dAB
α
)))
−DA
(
1−H
(
P
(EA)
e
DA
))]+
And the same result applies to the secrecy rate of Bob’s message to Eve by using,
αE = 1−DB
P (E)e =
P
(EB)
e
1− αE
Finally, in order to achieve symmetric secure communication, we set both rates to the minimum of achievable
secrecy rates for the two nodes. We follow the same min-max strategy as given in the proof of Theorem 3 to obtain
the lower bound on Rs.
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APPENDIX I
PROOF OF COROLLARY 5
By ignoring the noise effect at Eve, symbols where both transmitters are active will be correctly decoded at
Eve as the symbol with the highest transmit power. Hence, with no prior information regarding the source of any
transmitted symbol, Eve will not erase any symbol, i.e. E2 ∈ {(A,Bc), (Ac, B)}. Moreover, PE1→E2 = 0.5 for all
six possible combinations of E1 and E2, Pe|(A,B)→E2=0.25 for the two possible values of E2. By applying those
values, we get:
REA = REB = Pt(1− 0.5Pt)(1−H(0.25))
These values are achieved by employing a symmetric real-time detector at Eve, i.e. REA = REB , and each symbol
has to be decoded as being transmitted either by Alice or Bob. However, Eve may choose to maximize the value
max(REA, REB) by either maximizing only one of those values at the cost of minimizing the other, or by allowing
its decoder to match the same symbol to different sources, e.g., let PE1→(A,Bc) = 1 for all possible values of E1,
then,
DA = 1− (1− Pt)2,
note that Pe|(E1→(A,Bc)) remains the same. By applying the resulting probabilities in the last example, we get the
rate in (10). It is obvious that by symmetry, having E2 = (Ac, B) for all symbols results in the same rate.
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Fig. 1. Boundaries of achievable rate regions for the modulo-2 channel, when ǫ1 = 0.2, ǫ2 = 0.3, ǫe = 0.25, and µ1 = µ2 = 0.5. The
outer bound is the capacity of the two-way channel without the secrecy constraints.
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Fig. 2. Boundaries of achievable rate regions for the Gaussian channel, when g11 = g22 = 1, ge1 = 10, ge2 = 0.1, and ρ1 = 1, ρ2 = 100.
The outer bound is the capacity of the two-way channel without the secrecy constraints.
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Fig. 3. Boundaries of achievable rate regions for the Gaussian channel, when g11 = g22 = 1, ge1 = 5, ge2 = 0.1, and ρ1 = ρ2 = 1. The
outer bound is the capacity of the two-way channel without the secrecy constraints.
Fig. 4. Near field wireless communications scenario. Eve is assumed to be located outside a circle of radius rE whose center lies at the
mid-point between Alice and Bob.
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Fig. 5. Maximum achievable secrecy rate for different distance ratios between Eve and each of the two communicating nodes.
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Fig. 6. β vs. Rs in different configurations for the one way TDM scheme, Rs = 0.5[RM − RE ]+. We consider the case when Alice is the
transmitter and Bob is the legitimate receiver.
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Fig. 7. Pt vs. Rs in different configurations for the randomized scheduling communication scheme, Rs = [RM -max(REA,REB)]+.
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